Laches

A dialogue by Plato on Manliness. Similar in essence to Émile, or Treatise on Education

Lysimachus-- There are some people, you know1, who laugh at such things, and if one asks their advice, they will not say what they think, but make a guess at their consulter.

Lysimachus-- For each one of us has many excellent things to tell to the youngsters about his father–of their actions in war and in peace, and how they managed the affairs of the allies and of the city. But neither of us can talk of his own actions. We therefore feel somewhat ashamed of ourselves before these boys, and we blame our fathers for allowing us to be idle when we began to grow up, and devoting their time to other people's affairs.

Laches-- For to profess an art like this is an indivious thing, so that unless a man be wonderfully superfior to his fellows in manliness, he cannot avoid ridicule if he professes to be a master of this art.

Socrates-- For, I think, the coming to a good decision depends on the practical knowledge and not on a majority.

Socrates-- But I should not be surprised if Nicias or Laches have found it out or learned it; for as you know, they are wealthier than I and can afford to learn from others.

Socrates-- Now do you, Laches and Nicias, tell me each one, of you, with what great authority on educational matters have you associated? and did you acquire your knowledge by learning from somebody or by your own investigations? And if you acquired it by learning, tell us who were your respective teachers and who were your fellow-students, so that if we should ever have a respite from state affairs we may go to them and persuade them either by gifts or by compliments or by both to take the charge of our children and of yours so that they may not bring shame upon their parents by turning out badly.

Laches-- For when in a way I seem to be a lover of arguments and again a hater of them. For when I hear a man talking of virtue or any other branch of wisdom–one who is a man indeed and worthy of the words he speaks–I am exceedingly delighted because I see that both speaker and words are consistent and suited to one another. A man of this sort seems to me to be in every way a musician, and to be attuned to the best of harmonies, not that of a lyre or childish instrument, but to be attuned to the real living of a life in which hisactionsare consistent with his words.

It seems to be that Laches is referring to Integrity.

Socrates-- Now, which of the parts of virtue shall we prefer? I suppose it must be that to which the science of arms evidently tends. And I suppose most men will agree that that is manliness. Is it not ?

Laches-- By Zeus, Socrates, that is not difficult to define. You know, when a man voluntarily remains in the ranks under an attack from the enemy and does not retreat he is a brave man.

Socrates-- You spoke well, Laches; but–I suppose it was my fault for not speaking clearly that you did not give an answer to my question but to some quite different question.

…

Socrates-- This then was what I meant when I said that my bad way of putting the question was the cause of you not answer me properly. For I wished to learn from you not only about those who are brave in infantry tactics but in cavalry arctics also and in every kind of warfare, and not the brave in war only but those too who are brave in maritime dangers and those who are brave in enduring sickness or poverty or even political conjunctures, and again, not only those that are brave in enduring pains or fears, but those too that are skilled in fighting against desires or pleasures, both "by holding their ground and by returning to the attack"–for I suppose, Laches, that there are some people who are brave in these ways.

Footnotes:

1

you know–the English colloquial "you know" is very often the best equivalent to the Greek gar

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